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In an age where naturalistic views of the world and physicalist views 
of persons conceal the notion of the soul, Taliaferro and Goetz offer 
a comprehensive defense of the soul as substance. both show that the 
concept of a soul comes from a rich tradition of thought, is enjoying a 
present resurgence and has a promising future. Systematically, the authors 
discuss a range of views concerning personhood. Carefully and critically 
Taliaferro and Goetz move from Plato in Ancient times through the 
Continental thought up to present contemporary literature on souls. While 
it is historical it is not simply a commentary of views but it is intimately 
tied to present-day problems and insights as seen in cognitive science, 
philosophy of mind and philosophical theology, which Taliaferro and 
Goetz persuasively argue. Clearly, the book is a  efense more specifically 
of substance dualism (3-4). This is the notion that fundamentally there 
are two kinds of things in reference to human persons.
The structure includes Ancient Greek thought, medieval Christian 
thought, Continental thought, modern thought, contemporary 
problems raised against the soul and future considerations and projects 
concerning the soul. First, Taliaferro and Goetz consider the two most 
prominent figures in the history of thought on the Soul, namely Plato 
and Aristotle in Greek thought. Second, the authors work through the 
medieval Christian views of Augustine and Aquinas by linking their 
theological construction to the philosophical perspectives of both Plato 
and Aristotle. Third, the authors consider the thought of Descartes, 
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malebranche and leibniz in the chapter on Continental thought. 
Fourth, in modern thought of the 18th century the authors consider 
the dialectic oscillating around the concerns raised by Descartes and 
mechanistic philosophy. The primary thinkers considering these issues 
include: locke, butler, reid, Hume and Kant. Fifth, Taliaferro and Goetz 
consider historical and contemporary objections against the soul such 
as the problem of soul-body interaction, the problem of science, neural 
dependence, personal identity and evolution. Finally, Taliaferro and 
Goetz consider the prospects of the soul as a metaphysical concept and 
its ramifications for other concerns.
Taliaferro and Goetz offer a historical survey of the soul for the 
purposes of contemporary constructive development against materialist 
objections and against materialist biases toward reductive explanations 
of persons (4). Human persons, broadly speaking, are composed of two 
substancess5 both an immaterial substance/mind or soul, and a material 
substance – body/brain. The soul and mind are often used interchangeably 
throughout the book although this is not an exact portrayal of some 
variations of substance dualism that hold the mind to be a faculty of the 
soul, namely the hylomorphism of thinkers like Aristotle and Thomas. 
Nonetheless, substance dualism is broadly the position that is being 
surveyed and defended here. The most obvious evidences in favor of 
substance dualism offered include the fundamental and distinct nature 
of physical and non-physical things (1-3) and the common-sense view 
of persons (3). Taliaferro and Goetz argue that the natures of physical 
things and non-physical things are clearly distinct. Souls are essentially 
characterized and defined by subjectivity, phenomenological experience, 
first-person knowledge, internal knowledge and teleological causal 
explanation (see especially chapter 6). Whereas physical things, for which 
we are less clear, are essentially characterized or defined by mechanistic 
process, energy transfer (chapter 6), third-person knowledge (187-190), 
relational and extrinsic properties (see chapter 4, 147-149, 206), and 
complex systematic arrangement of particles (194-197). The authors 
support these assumptions and the distinction between the substances 
when commenting on Papineau’s view of the mental and non-mental: 
“In short, according to Papineau we cannot say for sure what it is to be 
physical, but we can be sure about what it is not: it is not something that 
is ultimately mental in nature. Instead, it is something that is ultimately 
nonmentally identifiable (207).” In agreement with Armstrong on the 
nature of the physical, Taliaferro and Goetz argue: “any final appeal 
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to mental entities such as purposes would count as a falsification of 
naturalism (207).” Thus, arguably, there are two distinct kinds of things 
hence substance dualism.
There are two noteworthy arguments in support of substance dualism 
that are argued for throughout: first-person consciousness and the 
unity-of-consciousness. The first-person consciousness argument is an 
argument that has rich historical precedence, but is still widely used today 
in contemporary literature. The argument shows distinctions of mental 
things with physical things and physical processes. The authors describe 
first-person consciousness as self-awareness or the perspective from 
introspection (i.e. looking inward) when discussing Plato’s view of the 
self and knowledge (15; see especially Plato’s Phaedo). Next, the author’s 
discuss it in the context of Augustine’s view of the self, which foreshadows 
Descartes’ famous cogito ergo sum. According to Augustine on the basis 
of first-person knowledge we know that we are simple in nature, one, 
aware of the self and its distinction from the body (34-36; see for example 
Confessions, VIII.4.9; On Free Choice of the Will, II.3). Next, the authors 
discuss Descartes’ view on pages 83-88. on pages 155-156, Taliaferro 
and Goetz offer an argument from first-person consciousness that this 
kind of knowledge has greater certainty than scientific knowledge, or in 
the least is presupposed with scientific knowledge. Second, the authors 
make use of the unity of consciousness argument as an apologetic for the 
soul’s existence, which too has a rich history and is commonly referred 
to in contemporary literature. This is the argument that suggests that 
physical things are unable to account for the unity of awareness because 
it is the kind of thing that is not a set of externally related neurons, but 
one unified thing that binds together all the aspects of the neural system 
(18). The author’s justify the fact of its being a historical argument with 
Plato (17-18), Aristotle (23-24), Descartes (85-87), and Kant (126-127). 
It is also widely used today in the philosophy of mind, mind-brain 
correlations and consciousness studies (18 and 156).
In the process of making a defense for substance dualism the reader 
will notice a clear bias, which will prove positive or negative depending 
on the reader’s presuppositions. The authors move beyond substance 
dualism to arguing for a ‘pure’ or ‘strict’ dualism against a ‘compound’ 
or ‘complex’ dualism. Pure dualism is the notion that I am strictly 
identified with my soul substance, which is keeping with a broadly 
Cartesian account of persons. The support for this claim is seen in their 
movement toward making a case for a simple soul, the survival of the 
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person (3-4), Person-body dualism (see 190-192), Personal Identity 
as a simple enduring continuant in the spirit of Chisholm (see 199) 
and the fact that we are non-physical like God (see 176). Finally, this 
is demonstrated in their explicit and specific defense of dualism in the 
Plato-Augustine-Descartes tradition (see especially 155 and 213-214). 
The benefits of this approach are clear, but it is not without difficulty. 
Those inclined to a more metaphysically holistic view of the mind-body 
might find themselves longing for further exploration and development 
of a more explicit compound dualism, hylomorphism or emergent 
dualism. Consequently, this is one potential downfall.
The highlights of this historical survey on the soul are numerous. 
I will consider three here. The first highlight is a defense of substance 
dualism utilizing ‘integrative’ dualism. Second, Taliaferro and Goetz 
exemplify a constructive method of doing philosophy and theology by 
drawing from historical sources. Third, Taliaferro and Goetz contribute 
to the discussion by providing a foundation and suggesting further areas 
of exploration.
one very significant and interesting issue is the notion of “integrative” 
dualism and realism. ‘Integrative’ is a term used in reference to dualism 
by Taliaferro in his book Consciousness and the Mind of God. It is a view 
that ties together the notions of duality and unity. Although there are 
two substances at work with a person, at least while embodied, there 
is a functional unity at work as well. So the physicalist’s insight that a 
person is one functioning unit or system, which seems confirmed by the 
empirical sciences, is coherently accounted for in integrative dualism. 
This notion in itself is not foreign to the notion of the soul throughout 
history, but it is codified more succinctly by Taliaferro and Goetz due 
to the pressing concerns and pressure from contemporary physicalists 
(this I believe is a helpful pressure). A gem that expresses the beauty 
of an integrative dualism is seen in their discussions of cognition and 
perception. Goetz and Taliaferro offer a view that is mid-way between 
direct realism and representational realism known as ‘integrative realism,’ 
which corresponds quite well to their integrative view of dualism. The 
authors put forth this solution as a response to an objection to substance 
dualism by Jaegwon Kim (144-146). Kim objects that it is incoherent 
for a soul and body to occupy the same space, for which, Taliaferro and 
Goetz respond by offering their solution of ‘integrative realism’. They 
argue there is nothing on the face of it controversial or contradictory 
about a soul (as a simple) occupying the same space as a body if in fact 
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the soul is spatial in some sense. Noting the problems and insights in 
both direct realism and representational realism they offer a mediating 
view that is an analogue for solving the ‘joint occupancy dilemma.’ They 
define integrative realism as such: “when you see us coming to greet you, 
you do not have a representation of us and then have to infer that you 
see us, but rather we appear to you through your sensory modalities. 
In veridical (reliable) experiences, there is an integration and proper 
functioning of organs and sensations such that, when you have the 
visual, auditory, and tactile sense of our greeting you by name and of 
our shaking your hand, these constitute the reality of what is taking 
place… under these circumstances, we are truly interacting physically 
and mentally (145).”
A second highlight is the use of a constructive method as stated in the 
introduction (4). When reflecting on this I am reminded of the great late 
medieval philosopher-historian etienne Gilson. In his work The Unity 
of Philosophical Experience he exemplifies a constructive method for 
doing philosophy by drawing from the resources in history to adequately 
address the present dialectical situation. This is similar to the approach 
taken by Taliaferro and Goetz. by offering a comprehensive survey from 
history the authors are able to address the issues and solutions from 
the past, connect the same issues from the past with the present and 
offer perspective on how to move forward. First-person arguments and 
the unity of consciousness argument are prime examples of historical 
resources that provide evidence for the distinctions in matter and non-
matter appropriated in the past yet alive in the present dialectic between 
dualism and physicalism.
Approaching the notion of soul in this way will have two effects. First, 
it is a counter influence to the overwhelming pressure from the ethos and 
pathos found in scientism and physicalism. The influence is due in part 
to its substantive nature that is presented in a readable and approachable 
manner. Second, it may have an impact on the academic disciplines 
centering on philosophy of mind/personal identity, philosophical 
theology and ontology. I say this because it is comprehensive in its 
historical scope and it demonstrates the pervasive nature of studies 
on the soul throughout history not only as a theological concept, but 
also as a philosophical concept. Goetz and Taliaferro nicely supply the 
groundwork for this, thus raising the awareness of some of the issues 
still in need of hard theoretical and/or empirical work. Specifically 
what comes to mind is the notion of a simple soul yet with a complex of 
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properties. It is uncertain how a simple soul could in fact have a complex 
of properties without also having parts. other issues include the notion 
of a soul and cognition, the notion that a soul is a complete substance 
and the notion of physical energy in physics and the role of the soul’s 
relation to it in causation. These and many other issues are deserving of 
further exploration, clarification and justification.
A third highlight overlaps with the previous highlight concerning 
a constructive method. The authors carry the contemporary discussion 
forward in chapter 8. Taliaferro and Goetz predict that the soul will 
illuminate four areas of study: worldview studies, the nature of the 
physical, cultural studies and values. one specific example relates values 
to the soul by considering ‘qualia’. Taliaferro and Goetz raise concerns 
for physicalism in accounting for values and ‘qualia’ by arguing that even 
physicalists see these as incompatible with strong forms of physicalism. 
The implication is that the soul offers a better way forward, thus 
warranting careful study.
There are two theological issues concerning the soul, not directly 
intimated by Taliaferro and Goetz, that are deserving of further attention 
in relation to mind-on-brain dependence and evolutionary thought. The 
first issue is how to make sense of the origin of souls if in fact souls 
seem to depend on properly functioning brains and are organically 
linked to other physical organisms in the evolutionary process. Second 
is the potential problem the mind on brain dependence and evolution 
pose for the idea of natural immortality. Natural immortality may have 
been a laughable issue in the past century, but if a simple soul substance 
is  viable option in the philosophy of mind then natural immortality is still 
a viable option. It could offer some help in accounting for other theological 
conundrums like the notion of the image of God, disembodied existence 
and a coherent and plausible account of the resurrection. Immortality is 
still a topic worth discussing in contemporary times, which is motivated 
by historical precedence in the likes of Plato, Augustine and Calvin to 
name a few.
The reader may find some of the solutions to objections raised against 
substance dualism incomplete. Take for example the objection from 
evolution (see 200-201). In it the authors raise the objection but only 
consider one facet of the problem, namely the possibility of animal souls. 
Taliaferro and Goetz affirm the likelihood of animal souls, but do not 
consider other related problems. other problems include the intuitive 
qualitative distinction between man and beast with the seeming unity of 
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physical organisms, and the compatibility of soul-creation with evolution. 
It might have been helpful to see a story addressing these issues that are 
seemingly in tension. but, given the brevity of length here the topic of 
evolution and substance dualism may require treatment elsewhere.
A Brief History of the Soul is a helpful contribution to philosophy 
of mind, philosophy of religion, and for philosophy in general. Courses 
in the philosophy of mind/personal identity, seminars on the soul, and 
theological anthropology would be wise to interact with this work due to 
its historical focus, clarity and insight. Taliaferro and Goetz demonstrate 
the viability and persistence of the soul concept in philosophy, as 
something the physicalist should consider more seriously.
